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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050192-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the court incorrectly refused to bind over charges for theft by deception 
and passing a bad check where evidence amply showed that defendant knew the checks 
would not be paid? "The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for 
trial is a question of law. Accordingly, we review that determination without deference to 
the court below." State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, Ijl 8, 20 P.3d 300 (internal citations 
omitted). This issue was preserved by the court's order dismissing the charges (R. 130-
33). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State appeals the magistrate's refusal to bind over George Wallace on charges 
that he committed theft by deception, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-405 (count 7) and that he issued a bad check, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1) (count 9), in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
George Wallace was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or 
about October 10, 2003, with theft by deception, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 (counts 6 and 7); communications fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801 (counts 8 and 10); 
issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
505(1) (count 9); and pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1603 (count 11) (R. 1-4). 
A preliminary hearing was held on April 7, 2004, before the Honorable Steven L. 
Hansen (R. 38-39; 138). After evidence was presented, the magistrate took the matter of 
bindover on all charges under advisement (R. 138: 81-83). Wallace moved to dismiss all 
counts (R. 44-50). Following a hearing, the magistrate issued a memorandum decision 
granting Wallace's motion and dismissing all counts (R. 81-90; 92). 
The State moved to reconsider the matter, to which a second memorandum 
decision was issued wherein the magistrate found that the State's motion was without 
merit (R. 93-108; 128). 
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On January 31, 2005, the magistrate issued its order dismissing all charges (R. 
130-33). The State filed a notice of appeal on February 24, 2005. (R. 135). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Count 71 - Theft by Deception 
On July 18, 2002, Deborah Wallace phoned Sharon Warner, an employee of 
Morris Murdock Travel, and asked Warner to get eleven tickets for flights the next day to 
Hawaii (R. 138: 46-48). Warner, with Morris's vice president's approval, agreed to 
procure the tickets and asked for cash. Deborah Wallace said she did not have the money 
at that point, but that she would on Tuesday. Deborah Wallace then asked Warner if she 
would take a check and hold it until the following Tuesday (R. 138:48). Specifically, 
Warner testified that Deborah told her: "Well, I don't have that much money right now, 
but I will on Tuesday. So if you can just take this check, post-date the check until 
Tuesday, I will have the funds here" (R. 138: 48). 
Warner procured the tickets and George and Deborah Wallace, brought a check to 
Warner's home in the amount of $11,496.30 to pay for the tickets (R. 138: 13-14, 47-49). 
Warner testified that when they brought her the check, the Wallaces gave her a hug and 
said'Thank you. We really appreciate this. We owe you tickets to Hawaii. We'll get 
you over to Hawaii to see us sometime" (R. 138: 49). 
Although the check was pre-dated July 17, 2002, both parties agreed that the check 
would not be cashed until the following Tuesday (R. 138: 48-49). Warner knew that the 
1
 The State's Statement of Facts addresses other counts with which Wallace was 
charged. Since the State is not disputing that the evidence regarding those charges 
was insufficient to bind Wallace over for trial, those facts are not relevant and will not 
be addressed here. (Br. of Appellant at 3-6, 9-10). 
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Wallace's were planning on moving to Hawaii at some point, but she did not know when 
(R. 138: 51). 
The following Tuesday, Warner called the bank to verify the funds were in the 
bank, but the Wallace's had not received the money they were expecting, and Warner was 
told by the bank that there were insufficient funds in the account to cover the amount of 
the check (R. 138: 49-50). Warner called Deborah Wallace in Hawaii and told her that 
the check would not clear (R. 138: 50). Deborah Wallace explained that they were 
expecting the money any time and to hold off a few more days and call the bank again (R. 
138: 50). After a few weeks, Warner deposited the check and it was returned due to 
insufficient funds (R. 138: 50). 
Warner testified that she did not remember specifically whether she ever talked to 
George regarding the insufficiency but that she thought on at least one occasion she 
talked directly with George (R. 138:51). However, Warner testified that it was "usually 
Debbieff that she spoke with regarding the check (R. 138:51). 
Morris Murdock Travel turned the check over to its legal department, and Lynette 
Ambrose, a paralegal with Morris Murdock Travel, spoke with Deborah Wallace on 
several occasions regarding the debt (R. 138: 53-54). Ambrose also testified that she 
never spoke directly with George Wallace regarding the insufficient checks, but that there 
were times when Deborah Wallace would turn and ask someone a question-presumably 
George-before she responded (R. 138:54). Ambrose testified that Morris Meetings, a 
subsidiary of Morris Murdock Travel, also organized arrangements with the Wallaces 
again in September 2002 in order to attend a Nu Skin convention (R. 138: 54-55). The 
Wallaces gave Morris Meetings two more checks totaling $1,860 for the convention, 
which were also returned for insufficient funds (R. 138: 54). 
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Toby O'Bryant, an investigator for Utah County, also testified that the check made 
to Morris Murdock Travel by the Wallaces was returned for insufficient funds (R. 138:6, 
13). 
Count 9 - Issuing a Bad Check 
The Tradewinds Estate ("Tradewinds") is owned by Mr. David Thielen (State's 
Exhibit 1 - 1102 statement of Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent).2 
O'Bryant testified that on July 19, 2002, George Wallace wrote a check in the 
amount of $3,096.84 to Tradewinds to cover rent on the Tradewinds estate for the time 
period of July 19, 2002 - July 31, 2002 (State's Exhibit 1). O'Bryant testified that the 
check was presented and returned for insufficient funds (R. 138:17). 
No further testimony was given during the preliminary hearing regarding this 
check. Further, this issue was not raised or discussed in the defense's motion to dismiss 
(R. 43-50) or the State's opposition to motion to dismiss (R. 51-61). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate correctly concluded that the State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to bind counts 7 and 9 over for trial. In order to bind over George Wallace for 
trial, the State had to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that 
Wallace committed theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 
and that he issued a bad check, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1). 
2
 The 1102 statement of Peggy Young, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1) was received 
without objection (R. 40; 138:18-19). 
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However, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that Wallace committed theft by deception by acting as an accomplice and 
encouraging and aiding his wife to commit acts which constituted the crime of theft by 
deception. Further, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that Wallace obtained the right to occupy Tradewinds' property by writing a check 
that he was reasonably certain would not be paid. 
Accordingly, the magistrate correctly refused to bind Wallace over for trial and 
Wallace requests that this Court uphold that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT-AS MAGISTRATE-CORRECTLY REFUSED 
TO BIND WALLACE OVER FOR TRIAL ON COUNTS 7 & 9 
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
THAT HE COMMITTED THE CRIMES OF THEFT BY DECEPTION 
AND ISSUING A BAD CHECK 
The State acknowledges that it failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that George Wallace committed the offenses charged in counts 6, 8, 10 
and 11 (Br. of Appellant at 13-14). However, as to counts 7 and 9, the State argues that 
Wallace's history of debt and poor business decisions and his practice of making lulling 
statements establish reasonable belief that Wallace knew that the account on which the 
checks were written and given to Morris Murdock Travel and Tradewinds would have 
insufficient funds. Wallace asserts that the State's argument is speculative and without 
merit; and therefore, is not a basis with which to overturn the magistrate's ruling since 
the State failed to produce any evidence that Wallace believed there would be 
insufficient funds to cover the check issued by Deborah Wallace to Morris Murdock 
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Travel. In fact, the only evidence the State presented regarding Wallace's mental state 
was that he rightfully believed there would be sufficient funds to cover the check. 
Accordingly, the magistrate correctly declined to bind Wallace over for trial. 
A. The Bindover Standard 
At a preliminary hearing, it is the State's burden to produce evidence ''sufficient 
for the magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ^ 10, 
44 P.3d 730 (citations omitted). Further, the prosecution must produce believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged to sustain its burden at the preliminary 
hearing stage." Id. (citations omitted). Stated differently, "the prosecution must present 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief 'that an offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it." State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, j^ 16, 26 P.3d 
223 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
Under the standard set forth in State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300, all the 
evidence and "all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are to be viewed "in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution." Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51 at ^ 20 (citing Clark, 2001 
UT 9 at |^ 20). If the evidence gives rise to alternative inferences, but the only 
reasonable inferences support the State's case, the magistrate must bind over the 
defendant. See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at J^ 20. However, if the "evidence is wholly lacking 
and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
prosecution's claim," the defendant should not be bound over for trial. Schroyer, 2002 
UT26atTJ10. 
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B. The State failed to produce adequate evidence that Wallace committed the 
crime of theft by deception. 
Wallace was charged with theft by deception, a violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-6-405. A person is guilty of theft by deception if: (1) the person obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by deception and (2) with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405. According to Utah law, " [deception 
occurs when a person intentionally creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of... fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is 
likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
401(5)(a)); or when a person intentionally "promises performance that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend 
to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform 
the promise in issue without other evidence of intent, or knowledge is not sufficient 
proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be 
performed" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(e)). 
The State claims that the only issue before this Court is "whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support a 'reasonable belief that defendant knew the $11,496.30 check 
to Morris Murdock would not be paid" (Br. of Appellant at 16). 
The State's argument is unsupportable by its own evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing. The State presented evidence that both Wallace and Warner, 
Morris Murdock Travel's agent, clearly understood that there were insufficient funds in 
the account on July 18, 2002 (R. 138: 48). The State also presented evidence that 
Warner understood that she was not to try to cash the "check" until the following 
Tuesday (R. 138:48). 
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The State asserts that Wallace's history of bad debt should be a basis to provide 
reasonable belief that Wallace knew he would not have sufficient funds to cover the 
check written to Morris Murdock Travel (Br. of Appellant at 18-22) and the fact that 
"none of defendant's purported expectations produced any payments to his victims nor 
did any proceeds from his purported ventures protect his bank accounts from 
involuntary closures" (Br. of Appellant at 22), should be enough to prove that he did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise that he made to Morris Murdock Travel would 
not be performed. 
Additionally, the State ignores the magistrates Memorandum Decision, wherein 
the magistrate found that the State presented evidence that Wallace expected "to receive 
a substantial sum of money from an investment and there was no evidence presented by 
the State contrary to this representation" (R. 87). The magistrate further found that the 
State could not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of insufficient funds and 
a failure to pay (R. 86). Clearly, the magistrate found that the State failed to produce 
sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that the funds would be insufficient 
(R. 146-47). 
In an effort to hide the fact that the State failed to meet its burden regarding 
intent, the State asserts the theory that George Wallace was acting as an accomplice to 
his wife (Br. of Appellant at 23). The State asserts that the prosecutor presented 
evidence that showed that George Wallace encouraged and aided his wife in committing 
acts that constitute the elements of the crime charged, when he elicited from Warner the 
testimony that George Wallace had accompanied his wife in delivering the check and 
had assisted his wife in lulling Warner and Ambrose (Br. of Appellant at 23). 
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The State would have the magistrate make a quantum leap, with no evidence 
presented, that George Wallace "encouraged, probably requested, and definitely aided 
his wife to obtain the tickets from Warner" (Br. of Appellant at 24). The State would 
have the magistrate ignore the fact that Wallace believed he would be receiving 
sufficient money to cover the "check" issued to Morris Murdock Travel. The State 
argues that the duty to "view evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution" 
means to ignore reasonable inferences favoring the defense. However, the State failed 
to present sufficient evidence to support any reasonable belief that George Wallace 
committed the offense of theft by deception. Specifically, there was no evidence 
presented by the State which would support a reasonable belief that Wallace 
intentionally engaged in deception against Morris Murdock Travel. 
One, the State's own witness, Warner, testified that she agreed to hold the check 
for a while and that she was informed by Deborah Wallace that they were expecting to 
shortly have money to cover the check (R. 138: 48-50). No evidence was introduced 
that George Wallace knew that the money to cover the check would not be received. 
Accordingly, the State failed to produce any evidence of deception under Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-401 (5)(e) which provides that deception occurs when an individual 
intentionally "Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will 
not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue 
without other evidence of intent, or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did 
not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed." All the evidence 
indicates that at the time Deborah Wallace issued the check and made arrangements for 
Morris Murdock to hold the check, both Wallace's fully expected that they would have 
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money to cover the check. Moreover, the mere fact that there ultimately was 
insufficient funds to cover the check is "without other evidence of intent or knowledge 
is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(e). 
Additionally, the State failed to establish the requisite element of deception under 
the other applicable subsection defining deception which is Utah Code Annotated § 76-
6-401(5)(a). This subsection indicates that deception occurs when an individual 
intentionally "creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of... fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction." Neither employee of Morris Murdock or any 
other witness produced any evidence that would support a reasonable belief that George 
Wallace created or confirmed by words or conduct that Deborah's statements to Warner 
in regards to the check were false or that he did not believe that there would be 
sufficient funds to cover the check. In fact, both employees from Morris Murdock 
testified to little—if any contact with George. Ambrose testified that she never spoke 
directly with George (R. 138: 54). Warner testified that the initial call came from 
Deborah and that most of her interaction was with Deborah (R. 138: 46-48, 50). Warner 
also testified that she may have had a conversation with George but she testified as to no 
specifics (R. 138: 51). Warner's only certain interaction with George was his presence 
when Deborah brought the check (R. 138: 47-49). 
Wallace asserts that this case is very similar to State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 
(Utah 1983) in which the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction for theft by 
deception for insufficient evidence. In Lakey the defendant paid for clothing with a 
check. However, he informed the seller that he should not cash the check immediately 
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because he would need a few days in which to make additional deposits so that the 
check would clear. The defendant was expecting money from three investors, who had 
assured him that the money would be paid imminently. The seller accepted the check on 
these terms. Defendant's bank subsequently dishonored the check because of 
insufficient funds. 659 P.2d at 1062. 
The issue in Lakey~as in this case-was "whether property obtained by passing 
what turned out to be a bad check was obtained 'by deception."' 659 P.2d at 1063. 
Lakey, like George Wallace, was not prosecuted for the crime of issuing a bad check. 
Id The Utah Supreme Court concluded that Lakey's conduct did not satisfy the 
statutory definition of deception set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40 l(5)(a) and 
(b) because at the time the transaction occurred the uncontradicted testimony was that 
the seller had been informed that additional time was required to make additional 
deposits for the check to be covered and that the seller had, nonetheless, agreed to this 
arrangement. 659 P.2d at 1063-64. 
The Utah Court also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
deception under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40l(5)(e). In reaching this holding the 
court stated 
A person knows that a promise will not be perfonned 'when he is aware' 
that the promise is 'reasonably certain' not be be perfonned. § 76-2-103(2). 
Mere negligence is insufficient to satisfy this definition. The only evidence that 
defendant was aware that his promised deposit of the necessary funds was 
'reasonably certain' not to be perfonned was testimony that previous checks had 
been bad and that the three investors defendant was counting on to contribute 
cash had previously failed to do so despite repeated requests.... 
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Lakey, 659 P2d at 1064. 
Ultimately the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction for theft by deception 
because the court was 
unable to conclude that reasonable minds could believe that defendant committed 
deception, as defined in the statute [on the date of the transaction]. While it is 
true that the necessary deposit was not made, this is not a case where the jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the party who promised the deposit had 
no reasonable prospect of being able to make it—i.e., was 'reasonably certain' that 
his promise would not be performed. Commercial misfortune is not a crime, and 
there is no theft by deception without proof of deception. 
Id. 
Wallace asserts that although Lakey concerned the reversal of a jury verdict for 
insufficient evidence as opposed to the decision of a magistrate, that the facts of this 
case are sufficiently similar to the facts in Lakey to prevent any reasonable belief by the 
magistrate-based upon the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing-to support the 
requisite standard that Wallace committed the crime of theft by deception. Accordingly, 
the magistrate correctly determined that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
bind Wallace over for trial on count 7. 
C. The magistrate correctly refused to bind Wallace over for trial because the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed the crime of 
issuing a bad check* 
The State argues that the magistrate failed to properly apply the bindover standard 
to the charge that Wallace issued a bad check to Tradewinds (Br. of Appellant at 25). 
The State further argued that the magistrate's findings were "clearly erroneous, and its 
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refusal to bind defendant over on this charge is incorrect" (Br. of Appellant at 25). The 
State asserts that because the defendant's motion to dismiss did not discuss count 9, the 
"logical response of the magistrate ... should have been to bind defendant over, if there 
were sufficient facts to support the bindover" (Br. of Appellant at 25). The State then 
asserts that there were sufficient facts presented at the preliminary hearing to bind 
Wallace over for issuing a bad check. The State's argument, based entirely upon 
unfounded speculation, is without merit and is not a basis with which to overturn the 
magistrate's ruling since the State failed to produce any evidence that Wallace believed 
there would be insufficient funds to cover the check issued to Tradewinds. In fact, the 
only evidence the State presented regarding Wallace's mental state was that he rightfully 
believed there would be sufficient funds to cover the check. Accordingly, the magistrate 
correctly declined to bind Wallace over for trial. 
Wallace was charged with issuing a bad check, a violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-505(1). Under that section, a person is guilty of issuing a bad check if: 
(1) the person 'issues or passes a check ... for the payment of money"; (2) the person 
passes the check "for the purpose of obtaining from any person ... any ... property, or 
thing of value or paying for any services..."; (3) the person "know[s] it will not be paid 
by the drawee"; and (4) "payment is refused by the drawee." 
The State claims that the only issue before this Court is whether the evidence was 
"sufficient to support a 'reasonable belief that defendant knew the $3,096.84 check to 
Tradewinds would not be paid" (Br. of Appellant, at 26). 
The State presented evidence that Wallace wrote a check on July 19, 2002 to 
Tradewinds in the amount of $3,096.84 for rent for the remainder of July and that the 
check was returned for insufficient funds (R. 138:17-18; State's Ex. 1). However, the 
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State failed to produce sufficient evidence relating to the element of the charge that 
Wallace knew the check would not be paid by the bank. The State argues that because 
the evidence shows that two checks were written within a two day period for large sums 
of money from the same account that Wallace should have known the check he wrote 
would be returned for insufficient funds. The State further asserts that Wallace's history 
of bad debt and making of lulling statements should be a basis to provide reasonable 
belief that Wallace knew he would not have sufficient funds to cover the check written to 
Tradewinds (Br. of Appellant at 27). 
However, the magistrate found that the State presented evidence that Wallace 
expected "to receive a substantial sum of money from an investment and there was no 
evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation" (R. 87). The magistrate 
further found that the State could not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of 
insufficient funds and a failure to pay (R. 86). Clearly, the magistrate found that the State 
failed to produce sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that the funds would 
be insufficient (R. 82; 86-87). 
In State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, the Utah Supreme Court combined two similar cases 
where the magistrate applied the directed verdict standard and found the prosecution had 
failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the requisite intent to show a crime had 
been committed. Id. at f^ 18. In both cases, the defendants attempted to cash forged 
checks at local banks mere hours after those checks were reported stolen. Id. at |^ 19. In 
both cases, after brief delays where the tellers did not immediately cash the check and 
said that there were problems with the accounts, the defendants exited the banks 
abandoning the forged checks. Id. 
15 
The Utah Supreme Court observed that in both cases, the facts gave rise to two 
alternative inferences. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at |^ 20. The Court stated that the defendants 
"may have simply assumed they had themselves been defrauded and, thus, felt there was 
no reason to take the checks with them." Id. On the other hand, however, the Court 
observed, "one could reasonably infer an intent to defraud," because if the defendants 
were holders in due course, they "would have waited for approval rather than leaving" the 
bank after a short delay. Id. Moreover, both defendants "presented checks only hours 
after the reported thefts." Id. 
While the Court found that the facts gave rise to two different inferences, it found 
that the only reasonable inference was the one the prosecution was supporting. See Clark, 
2001 UT 9 at K 20. Since the only reasonable inferences supported a probable cause 
finding of guilt, the Court found sufficient evidence to bind over the defendants. Id. 
The present case is distinguishable from Clark. Here, the State failed to produce 
sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that there would be insufficient funds to 
cover the "check" by the following Tuesday. In fact, the only evidence the State 
presented regarding Wallace's mental state was evidence by way of Warner. Warner 
testified that Wallace believed he would have sufficient funds by the following Tuesday 
to cover the "check" made out on July 18, 2002 (R. 138: 48-50). Not at any point during 
Warner's or any other witnesses' testimony did anyone testify that Wallace knew or 
believed that there would be insufficient funds on the following Tuesday to cover the 
"check." Moreover, Warner testified that Deborah Wallace explained that she was 
expecting an investment to come through to pay for the "check" (R. 138: 50, 52). Not 
one witness testified that Wallace lied. Therefore, there is a complete lack of evidence 
relative to a necessary element of the charge. 
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The State attempts to infer that Wallace knew there would be insufficient money 
by claiming that over two and one-half years, 254 checks were issued by George or 
Deborah Wallace were returned for insufficient funds (Br. of Appellant at 19). However, 
O'Bryant, the witness who provided the testimony of the 254 checks, lacked specific 
knowledge as to the details of who wrote the checks, what was ultimately paid, or the 
reasons for the overdrafts (R. 138: 21-22). The State also attempts to prove Wallace's 
mental state by lambasting his history of debt and financial difficulties through repeating 
in the Statement of Facts the circumstances surrounding the other charges which the State 
concedes were properly dismissed (Br. of Appellant at 3-11). The mere accusation that 
the Wallaces have had financial difficulties in the past is insufficient believable evidence 
to establish that they were not expecting to receive sufficient money to cover the "check" 
issued to Morris Murdock Travel. 
The bulk of the State's brief is an attempt to discredit Wallace and his financial 
history, believing this will provide reasonable belief that Wallace knew that a particular 
investment would not come through. The State presented no evidence that Wallace knew 
there would be insufficient funds to cover the "check." In fact, the State presented no 
evidence regarding the investments that Wallace was relying upon. The State could have 
easily investigated the investments Wallace was referring to in order to determine 
whether there was a reasonable basis to believe that he would have sufficient funds to 
cover the "check." Instead, the State relied solely upon unfounded inferences that 
because the Wallaces had financial problems in the past, Wallace knew that there would 
be insufficient funds to cover the "check." The magistrate correctly detemiined that these 
unfounded inferences were insufficient to show that Wallace knew that the money would 
not be there. 
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Like Clark, the facts in this case give rise to two alternative inferences. Either 
Wallace knew that there really was no investment money coming, or Wallace rightfully 
believed that money would be coming from the investments sufficient to cover the 
"check." However, unlike Clark, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
State's own evidence supports the fact that Wallace believed he would be getting enough 
money from the investments to cover the "check." Since there is only one reasonable 
inference to be made, Clark required the magistrate to refuse to bind over Wallace for 
trial. 
Essentially, the State is seeking to relieve itself from the burden of showing 
Wallace's mental state with regards to § 76-6-505(1). The State put on no evidence that 
Wallace knew the money would not be there; however, the State asserts that because 
Wallace gave a check with insufficient funds at the time the check was issued, and 
because he had a troubled financial history, that is a sufficient mens rea showing of 
probable cause that Wallace knew the check would be returned for insufficient funds. 
If such a position were adopted, the fact that a person issued a check and it was 
returned for insufficient funds would be all a prosecutor needs to bind a defendant over 
for trial. Fortunately, such is not the requirement under § 76-6-505(1). Accordingly, the 
magistrate correctly determined that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to bind 
Wallace over for trial on count 9. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wallace asks that this court to affirm the decision of the trial court in refusing to 
bind over the charges for trial for insufficient evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of January, 2006. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to Ken Bronston, Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 
300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 3rd day of 
January, 2006. 
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§ 76-6-401. Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal 
property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments or other writings 
representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property, labor, sendees, or 
otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such 
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or 
any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or 
invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of possession or of some 
other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to 
labor or services, to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, 
would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will 
recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct 
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by 
conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not 
now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; 
or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest, 
adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; 
or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, 
however, that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of intent or 
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed. 
§ 76-6-405. Theft by deception 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters having no 
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications 
addressed to the public or to a class or group. 
§ 76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft-Presumption 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the purpose 
of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid 
by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for which payment is 
refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if he had no 
account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the purpose 
of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or 
draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to make 
good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14 days 
of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the offense is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the 
offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the 
offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree 
felony. 
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Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Counts 1-5 of the Information apply to Defendant, Deborah Wallace. 
2. Counts 6-11 of the Information apply to Defendant, George Wallace. 
3. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 1 with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, for 
a check that was written to Don Horton in the amount of $13,000 and for a $3,000 check 
written to Edward Martinez. These checks were written on July 17, 2002. Mrs. Wallace 
told both Mr. Horton and Martinez that her account lacked sufficient funds and instructed 
them to wait a few days before cashing the checks, as she was expecting sufficient funds 
to be deposited into her account. However, when the gentlemen attempted to cash the 
checks, there was insufficient funds. 
4. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 2, issuing a bad check, and Mr. Wallace, theft by 
deception, for a check written by Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel in the amount 
of approximately $ 11,000 on July 18, 2002. The check was dated July 17, 2002, and Mr. 
Wallace asked the agent, Sharon Warner, to not cash the check for a few days because 
there was not sufficient funds in the account that the check was drawn on, but that 
sufficient funds were expected to arrive from a business deal. However, the sufficient 
funds did not arrive and the check did not clear. 
5. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 3 and Mr. Wallace in Count 8 for Communication 
Fraud, which involves a transaction between Mrs. Wallace and Catryna Faux. Mrs. Faux 
performed housekeeping services and Mrs. Wallace still owed her about $1,063 in back 
wages. Mrs. Faux testified that while she lived in Springville, Utah she had loaned 
money to Mrs. Wallace on three separate occasions. The first two loans were repaid, but 
the third one, amounting to $1,129.32 was not repaid. Mrs. Faux and her husband then 
voluntarily traveled with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace to Hawaii, with the promise of jobs. 
While in Hawaii the Wallaces borrowed additional money from the Fauxs. 
6. In September 2002, the Wallaces persuaded the Fauxs to attend a NuSkin convention in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Wallaces told the Fauxs that they would pay them $6,000 
when they arrived at the convention, based upon monies the Wallaces were expected to 
receive. When the Fauxs arrived in Utah, they learned the Wallaces did not receive the 
funds and "that it was a big mess." Whereupon the Fauxs moved back to Utah, as they 
could not afford to remain in Hawaii. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that 
"I know [the Wallaces] felt bad about not getting the money, and [Mrs. Wallace], you 
know, in good will, said, 'We'll pay you back for those expenses.5" PLH Trans, at 67. 
7. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 4 and Mr. Wallace in Count 10 for Communication 
Fraud. These charges stem from a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. The 
Wallaces and the Stonelys entered into a contract for the sale of the Stonelys' home. 
However, the defendants became delinquent in payments between September of 1997 and 
June of 2002. In addition, the defendants also failed to pay property taxes. The Wallaces 
were delinquent in the amount of $57,714.40. As a result of the delinquency, the 
Wallaces signed a warranty deed, deeding the property back to the Stonelys "in payment 
of all monies owing." PLH Trans, at 75. 
8. Mrs. Wallace is charged with Count 5 and Mr. Wallace with Count 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, to include all other creditors that were not repaid by the Wallaces. 
9. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 6, theft by deception, for an agreement he entered into 
with Mr. Horton. Mr. Horton loaned the defendant $10,000 to make an investment. The 
defendant was unable to repay Mr. Horton the principal or interest when the amount came 
due. 
10. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 9, issuing a bad check. However, the State fails to 
provide the Court with sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge. 
11. The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was conducted on April 7, 2004, after which the 
Court took the issue of binding over the charges under advisement and to allow counsel 
to brief the issue. 
12. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, whereupon the State filed a motion in 
opposition. Oral Arguments were held on October 19, 2004. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is "ferreting out . . . groundless and improvident 
prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 504 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (2004). In order to bind a defendant 
over at a preliminary hearing, the Court must find that there is probable cause sufficient to 
establish the "crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id. 
(citations omitted). "In making a determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." Id. "The defendant should be bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim." Id. The State must present a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995)(citation omitted). 
L Count 1, issuing a bad check, is dismissed because the checks were not written for value. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check for events arising out of 
checks that were written to Mr. Horton and Mr. Martinez on July 17, 2002, To support a charge 
of Issuing a Bad Check, the State must establish that the defendant drafted a check for payment 
with the purpose of receiving something of value knowing that the check would not be honored 
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due to insufficient funds. The State supports its position based upon the insufficient funds. 
However, the State must establish that the checks were written for exchange of value. Issuing a 
check for exchange of value is an essential element that the State must satisfy. The State argued 
that something of value was exchanged because the elimination of debt should be considered 
value. This Court disagrees. The facts of the case clearly show that on July 17, 2002, when Mrs. 
Wallace wrote the checks, neither Mr. Martinez or Horton were given any new value to the 
defendants. See Howell Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). It was nothing more than a 
promise to pay in the future, without adding new or additional terms to previous agreement that 
arose from the July 2, 2001 transactions. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 is 
granted. 
II. Counts 2 & 7. Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the 
State fails to establish misrepresentation by Mrs, Wallace, nor does the State establish 
actual deception by Mr. Wallace. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 2, Issuing a Bad Check, and George Wallace is 
charged with Count 7, Theft by Deception, for events arising out of checks that were written by 
Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel. The Defendant argues that because Murdock Travel 
agreed to withhold depositing the check for a few days that the check falls out of the definition of 
a check, which must be payable on demand, and that it should be regarded as only a promise to 
pay in the future. The Defendant cites State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953) in support of her 
position. In Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court stated that postdated checks did not fall under the 
bad check statute, however, the statute applied if there was misrepresentation made at the time 
the check was written. This Court finds that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of misrepresentation. 
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the defendant wrote the 
checks with the knowledge that there would be insufficient funds based upon the Wallaces' 
history of debt. However, there was ample testimony at the preliminary hearing that the 
Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and 
there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant does 
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not carry the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather 
this burden rests solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's were 
engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money 
arriving from a business deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces 
were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. The 
State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of receiving money was a 
misrepresentation and the State can not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of 
insufficient funds and a failure to pay. 
Moreover, as pertaining to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State is required to establish 
some evidence that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that is false, 
fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct 
that is not true, or promises performances that he does not intend to preform. Here, the State has 
failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact 
that Morris Travel would be repaid. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Ms. 
Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's wife and not the 
Defendant. Therefore, since the State is unable to satisfy all elements of the charges, the 
defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 7 is granted. 
III. COUNT 3 & 8, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State failed to establish 
that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to defraud the Fauxs of at least $5.000. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of dealings with the Fauxs. To bind over for a charge of Communication 
Fraud, a second degree felony, the State must establish that the defendants devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another of at least $5,000 or something other than monetary value, and that the 
events occurred in Utah County, Utah. The State contends that the Fauxs were defrauded out of 
$7,286.83. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs, Faux testified that in Utah County the following 
debts were made by Mrs. Wallace: $1,129.32 of which Deborah borrowed from Mrs. Faux to pay 
for her son's rent-a-car, and for $1,063 in wages for Mrs. Faux's employment as a housekeeper in 
Springville, Utah. However, based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the 
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remaining transactions all occurred in Hawaii and not in Utah County, Utah and therefore those 
transactions can not be calculated in the total figure to establish communication fraud. 
Therefore, since the monetary value that was accrued in Utah County, Utah does not exceed 
$5,000 the State is unable to establish probable cause as to all elements of the charge. 
In addition, this Court finds that the debt that accrued in Utah County, Utah does not 
amount to communication fraud. Based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, 
it was established that on previous occasions that the defendants did repay money on previous 
loans they owed the Fauxs, which is contrary to the State's position. Moreover, no testimony 
was presented at the Preliminary Hearing to show that the Wallaces' expectation of funding was 
fraudulent. Since intent to defraud is an essential element of Communication Fraud, and the 
State failed to satisfy this element, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 3 
and 8, Communication Fraud. 
IV COUNT 4 & 10, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State has failed to 
establish that the delinquent mortgage and tax payments was an intent to defraud the 
Stonelys, 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. To bindover a 
communication fraud the State must satisfy its burden by presenting some evidence of a scheme 
or artifice to defraud another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises 
or material omissions. However, the State supports its position by claiming that delinquent 
payments is sufficient to establish communication fraud and that the defendants were spending 
money to finish the basement instead of paying their other debts. These assertions are not 
sufficient to satisfy the State's burden. The State fails to present any evidence of a scheme or 
artifice. Moreover, delinquent payments are not sufficient to establish probable cause of an 
intent to defraud. Finally, this Court finds that the fact that the Stonelys executed and recorded, 
through their attorney, a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all obligations owed by the 
Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's position that the Wallaces intended to defraud 
the Stonelys. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 10 is granted. 
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V. Counts 5 & 1L Pattern of Unlawful activity, are dismissed because the Wallaces do not 
constitute an enterprise, nor does their conduct constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as 
defined by statute. 
Both defendants are charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity. To bind over Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, the State must establish that probable cause exist that the Wallaces constitutes 
an enterprise and of a pattern of unlawful activity. An "enterprise55 means any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities.55 U.C.A. section 76-10-1602(1). The State contends that the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise under the statute, but the State fails to articulate how the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise, other than the mere fact that they are married to each. The State failed to 
present any evidence or authority to establish thai a married couple constitutes an enterprise as 
defined by the statute. In a recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals states that "[a]n 'association 
in fact5 enterprise £is provided by evidence of an ongoing organization formal or informal, and by 
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.'55 State v. Bradshaw, 508 
Utah.Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 2004)(citations omitted). An enterprise is a "continuing unit 
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.55 State v. McGrattu 749 P.2d 631 
(Utah App. 1988)(stating that the individuals had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose 
of making money with the sale of drugs). The State cites no authority suggesting that marriage 
creates an enteiprise. Courts have universally rejected attempts to extend the scope of 
antiracketeering laws and to reject efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in 
RICO clothing.55 Bradshaw, 508 Utah.Adv. Rep at 16. This Court finds that the mere fact that 
the Wallaces are married does not constitute an enterprise. It is the conclusion of this Court that 
it was not the legislative intent to include marriages as an enterprise within the scope of the 
statute scheme to constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as contemplate in U.C.A. section 76-
10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces pattern of debt does not constitute unlawful pattern of activity 
as described by the statute. The statute requires at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but are the same or similar. Such activities that are prohibited 
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are theft by deception or communication fraud. However, as stated previously, this Court finds 
that the conduct of the Wallaces do not amount to acts of either commercial fraud or theft by 
deception. Moreover, this Court finds that the defendants did not use or invest the money they 
borrowed in a proscribed manner, as required by the statute. The "language of the statute is clear 
that defendants] must 'use or invest5 the proceeds from the unlawful activity in the proscribed 
manner, namely the 'acquisition,5 'establishment,' or 'operation of an 'enterprise.5'5 Id.; See 
State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988)(U[UPUAA} makes it a crime to use the profits 
of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise."); and Accord State v. 
Hutchines, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App, 1997)("A [RICO} violation occurs not when the 
defendant engages in the predicate acts, but only when he uses or invests the proceeds of that 
activity in an enterprise,'")(citation omitted). 
Therefore, this Court grants the Defendants motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity. 
VI COUNT 6, Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the State failed to show actual 
deception by the defendant when he persuaded Mr. Horton to loan him $10.000. 
Theft by deception requires that the State prove the defendant created or confirmed by 
words or conduct a fact that is false, fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created 
or confirmed by words or conduct that is not true, or promises performances that he does not 
intend to preform. The State contends that Mr, Wallace committed a theft by deception by 
entering into an agreement to have Mr. Horton make an investment of $10,000, without 
intending to repay him. However, the only evidence the State presents to support its contention 
is the defendant's failure to repay. The State did not provide any evidence regarding the nature 
of the investment and whether the investment was fraudulent. There was no evidence presented 
to establish whether there was either a fictitious investment project or whether the money was 
actually invested but that the project failed to perform as had been expected by the Defendant 
The fact that the money was not repaid is insufficient to establish an intent to deceive; the State 
must present some evidence that a "big deal" was not legitimately expected by the defendant and 
that the lack of repayment was not a result of commercial misfortune. Furthermore, there was 
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testimony presented that the agreement between the defendant and Mr. Horton took place 
simultaneously when the defendant and Mr Martinez entered into the identical agreement. Mr. 
Martinez received full repayment of the loan's principal which supports the position that the 
defendant possessed the intent to repay, rather than to deceive. In addition, there was evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing that there had been a history of paying debts to Mr. 
Martinez. 
The State failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false 
impression of fact that Mr. Horton would be repaid. Not every unfilled promise is turned into 
deception. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983). A lack of repayment is insufficient 
to establish probable cause that the defendant intended to defraud either Mr. Horton or Mr. 
Martinez, This Court finds that there lacks probable cause to bindover Count 6 and that this 
charge is dismissed. 
VII The State fails to provide sufficient facts for Count 9> Issuing a Bad Check. 
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the Defendant's motion, nor was it 
discussed in oral arguments. Since this Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the 
nature of this charge, Count 9 is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence presented to the Court at the Preliminary Hearing; Oral Arguments 
and Memorandums, this Court finds that the State has been unable to establish probable cause for 
each and every element of the charges. Moreover, this Court finds that the State failed to meet its 
burden to show that the defendants conduct raised to the level of theft and fraud, rather than mere 
commercial misfortune. Therefore this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss all 
counts. The Defendants are to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
On a final note, it appears, based upon the facts of this case and the arguments presented 
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by the State, that the State is making the statement that there should be a policy to criminally 
charge individuals who run into financial difficulties, are unable to pay debts, file for bankruptcy, 
have foreclosed on their mortgage, or who fail to meet their contractual obligations, and that 
these debtors should be subject to criminal sanctions, along with any potential civil actions. In 
these situations, there are often a multitude of unpaid debts to various creditors, however, it is 
clear that the criminal courts are not the proper avenue to deal with these situations, nor should 
they be used to convert ordinary civil debt into criminal restitution. 
DATED this <? day of November, 2004. 
B Y T 
STEVENEHHANSEN, JUDGE 
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These matters came before the Court for preliminary hearing on April 7,2004. 
Present were Dave Wayment appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Gunda Jarvis on behalf 
of George Wallace ("George"), and Jennifer Go wans on behalf of Deborah Wallace 
("Deborah"). The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to 
brief issues relative to the bind-over. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on 
November 30, 2004, wherein it found that all charges should be dismissed because the 
State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing, to wit: 
Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check: The State failed to present any evidence that 
Deborah drafted a check for payment with the purpose of receiving something 
of value, or that she did so knowing that the check would not be honored due to 
insufficient funds. 
Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception: Relative to 
Count 2, the State failed to present any evidence of fraudulent intent when 
Deborah instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the check for a 
period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account. 
As to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State failed to establish any 
evidence that George created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that was 
false, or that he failed to correct a false impression that he created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that was not true, or that he promised performance that he 
did not intend to perform. Moreover, the evidence established that Ms. Warner 
dealt exclusively with Deborah. 
Counts 3 & 8, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, because the 
monetary value that accrued in Utah was less than $5,000, the State is unable as 
a matter of law to meet the value element of these charges. Further, the State 
presented no evidence that the Defendants' communications were made with 
any intent to defraud, or that the Wallaces engaged in a scheme or artifice. To 
the contrary, Ms. Faux testified that she believed the Defendants acted in good 
faith and were simply unable to meet their financial obligations due to 
unforeseen economic hardship. 
Counts 4 & 10, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, the State 
has failed to establish any evidence of a scheme or artifice to defraud or to 
obtain anything of value. Further, the undisputed fact that the Stonelys 
executed and recorded a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all 
obligations owed by the Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's 
position that the Wallaces intended to defraud the Stonelys, or that the Wallaces 
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engaged in a scheme or artifice, or that they received anything of value. 
Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful Activity; The State has failed to establish 
any evidence or cite to any authority that the Wallaces are an enterprise or that 
their conduct constituted a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by statute. 
The mere fact that the Wallaces are married is not sufficient to establish an 
enterprise within the scope contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces' pattern of debt does not constitute a pattern of 
unlawful activity as defined by the controlling statute; nor does it arise to the 
level of criminal conduct, as previously noted herein. Moreover, the State has 
completely failed to present any evidence that the defendants used or invested 
the proceeds from the alleged illegal activity for the acquisition, establishment, 
or operation of an enterprise. 
Count 6, Theft by Deception: The State has failed to establish any evidence 
that George had any intent to deceive Mr. Horton, or that George created, 
confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact regarding repayment, or 
that the failure to repay was anything more than commercial misfortune. 
Rather, the evidence showed that George intended to repay the loan. The mere 
lack of repayment is insufficient to establish probable cause as to the essential 
element of intent to defraud. 
Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check: This issue was not raised in either the State's 
or the Defendant's motion, and was not discussed at oral arguments. The Court 
was not given sufficient facts to detennine the nature of this charge. 
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In summary, each of the State's creditor-witnesses testified that the Wallaces 
were expecting a large sum of money with which to pay all their debts. There was no 
testimony or inference that this expectation was a misrepresentation. To the contrary, the 
State's evidence includes that the Wallaces have a history of repaying their debts, they 
signed a warranty deed returning residential property to the sellers after the Wallaces 
made improvements, and that the Wallaces acted in good faith. None of the State's 
witnesses testified that the Wallaces intended to defraud anyone, nor can the same be 
inferred in light of the substantial evidence to the contrary. In short, this case represents 
an improper attempt to use the criminal justice system as a means to collect a civil debt. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that all the charges in the Information 
are hereby dismissed. 
BY THE COURT this 31 day of January, 2005. 
d-y 
Judge Stcvorf^Unsea^S^tw^ / 0 AJ-< 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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